How Many Fighter Aircraft Does Australia Have? Assessing the RAAF’s Combat Strength
Recent maritime activity in Australia’s vicinity has highlighted a significant defense challenge, often referred to as a deterrence gap. Waiting for long-term defense acquisition programs to deliver results years or decades from now may leave the nation vulnerable to ongoing “grey zone” pressure. Acknowledging this, a critical question arises: How Many Fighter Aircraft Does Australia Have, and is this force sufficient to provide credible deterrence and rapid response capabilities?
Boosting air combat capability is identified as the most immediate and effective method to address Australia’s current strategic gap. This requires a focus on two core elements: increasing the number of combat aircraft and enhancing airborne refueling capacity.
Historically, the conventional thinking suggested that 100 fighter aircraft were adequate for Australia’s defense needs. This perspective often stemmed from the idea that the Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) four fighter squadrons had distinct mission specializations. However, with the advent of modern multi-role aircraft featuring advanced sensor fusion, this argument based on specialized roles appears outdated.
Given the evolving strategic environment and technological advancements, can a force of just 100 aircraft genuinely offer credible deterrence across a vast continent?
Currently, the RAAF operates a total of 108 combat-capable aircraft. This fleet comprises 72 F-35A Lightning stealth fighters, 24 F/A-18F Super Hornet multi-role fighters, and 12 EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft. These jets are supported by a fleet of seven A330 MRTT tanker-transports, designated KC-30As by the RAAF, which are crucial for extending the range and endurance of the combat fleet.
Royal Australian Air Force F-35A fighter jet refueling mid-air from a KC-30A tanker, highlighting air power capabilities
However, the total inventory numbers don’t paint the full picture of operational readiness. The Australian Department of Defence does not publicly release specific combat aircraft availability figures. For comparison, in 2019, the then US Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, set a goal for the US Navy and Air Force to achieve an 80 percent mission-capable rate for their combat aircraft fleets.
The RAAF’s F-35A force is structured around four squadrons, one of which serves as a training unit during peacetime. Each operational squadron is nominally allocated 18 aircraft, with the intention of having around 14 ready for duty while others cycle through maintenance. Typically, two of these 14 are kept as spares during squadron operations. Therefore, in a crisis situation, the Australian government might realistically expect to deploy approximately 36 operational F-35As. Applying similar considerations to the legacy fleet, this translates to potentially around 16 available F/A-18Fs and eight EA-18G Growlers.
This calculation suggests a force of no more than 60 operational combat aircraft available at any given time for a landmass roughly equivalent in size to Europe. This number is arguably insufficient to effectively cover and defend such a vast area. While surge operations might temporarily see all 60 aircraft available, sustained crisis operations—such as maintaining defensive combat air patrols simultaneously over Australia’s east, north, and west coasts, or keeping aircraft on high alert for rapid intercepts—would quickly strain the force’s sustainment capabilities.
Historical data from British and US air force operations indicates that actual mission-availability rates can sometimes be even lower than target goals, often due to challenges like unreliable parts supply chains. On an island continent like Australia, air power represents the fastest and most efficient means of establishing deterrence. Yet, the current RAAF inventory and operational availability suggest a shortfall in this crucial area. A comprehensive fighter aircraft comparison reveals how force size impacts capabilities.
Comparing the RAAF to other air forces relative to land size highlights this disparity. The Royal Air Force, operating from a landmass only about 3 percent the size of Australia, fields 171 combat aircraft and 14 tankers. Japan’s air force, covering a landmass roughly 5 percent of Australia’s, possesses approximately 330 fighters. Few other nations appear committed to defending such a large territory with a relatively modest air force. The only comparable air force in terms of size to the RAAF is Canada’s, which operates 79 fighters. This perspective underscores the significant task assigned to Australia’s relatively small combat air arm. Understanding the generation of fighter aircraft also explains capability leaps.
If Australia is serious about safeguarding its strategic independence, which includes the capacity to credibly deter potential adversaries, a significant increase in the RAAF’s fighter force size is necessary. A proposal involves adding two additional operational squadrons, which would mean acquiring another 36 aircraft, along with four more A330 MRTT tankers to support extended operations. This expansion should be phased and complemented by the introduction of unmanned semi-autonomous teamed aircraft, potentially at a ratio of three uncrewed systems (some equipped for refueling) for each additional crewed combat aircraft.
Expanding the crewed fighter force to seven operational squadrons (including the electronic attack squadron but excluding the training unit) and augmenting it with approximately 100 autonomous aircraft could potentially grow the RAAF’s total combat capability to around 240 aircraft before 2034. This significantly larger force would reduce the inherent fragility of the current air combat capability by providing greater depth and numbers. Furthermore, it would equip the government with a much broader range of operational options in a crisis.
The inherent flexibility of packaged air combat aircraft means they can rapidly switch roles and redeploy to different locations within hours. Their mission set is diverse, ranging from air policing and regional assurance tasks to cruise missile defense, maritime strike operations, and counter-air missions. With a larger force, aircraft could potentially be stationed permanently on both the west and east coasts, enhancing response times and coverage. A 4th generation fighter aircraft comparison shows the diverse capabilities even within that generation.
The United States is the only nation currently capable of supplying 36 advanced fighters relatively quickly. The F-35A stands out as the obvious choice, not least because Lockheed Martin’s production lines are delivering around 150 of these fifth-generation fighters annually. Furthermore, acquiring aircraft designs already in service minimizes the logistical and operational risks associated with introducing entirely new types into the fleet. Discussing capabilities, one might consider how norad releases images of u.s. fighter aircraft intercepting russian aircraft, demonstrating real-world air power roles.
Over the longer term, establishing policy settings that support the development and acquisition of long-range autonomous and teamed systems can further enhance strategic security. However, the immediate need is for an air combat system capable of enabling Australia to understand, decide, and act swiftly and effectively. The foundational elements of this system are already in place. The RAAF operates capable surveillance aircraft like the Wedgetail for airborne early warning, P-8A Poseidon for maritime patrol, and MC-55A Peregrine for electromagnetic surveillance. Combined with the extensive Jindalee over-the-horizon radar network and robust Five Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangements, these assets provide a reasonable picture of regional activities and potential threats.
However, there must be a greater emphasis on the ‘action’ component of this system – the combat aircraft themselves. Effective deterrence fundamentally relies on the credible potential for a rapid and decisive response. While ambitious, this proposal requires significant investment in airbase infrastructure and support systems, particularly across northern and western Australia. Nevertheless, it presents a realistic and actionable plan to enhance Australia’s future security. Crucially, it is a plan that can be implemented in years, not decades, offering a timely response to pressing strategic challenges.
